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INTRODUCTION 
Developing countries account for  84 percent of the world's population, and 93 percent of 
the worldwide burden of disease. These figures starkly contrast the fact that these same 
nations account for only 18 percent of global income, and a meager 11 percent of global 
health spending. Furthermore, of the 1.4 trillion disability-adjusted life years (DALYs) 
lost annually around the world, the developing world corresponds to an overwhelming 93 
percent of this burden, while industrialized nations represent a mere 7 percent of lost 
years.[Schieber,G. and Maeda A: 1999]. Disability-adjusted life years (DALYs) are a measure 
by which international development agencies quantify the burden of disease. In layman terms, 
DALYs account for the years of life lost due to the effects of disease. DALYs are calculated 
using a two-thirds mortality and one-third morbidity ratio. 
Among the developing world, South Asia, which is predominantly represented by India, 
ranks amongst the lowest in health spending: a central problem that hinders India's ability 
to advance its society. Figure 1 illustrates South Asia's global position in health spending: 
Figure 1  
Global distribution of health spending, and population among low-and middle-income 
countries 
1994  
Gross domestic 
product (%) 
Health spending (%) Population (%) 
East Asia and Pacific 24 17 35 
Europe and Central Asia 19 18 11 
Latin America and Caribbean 35 42 9 
Middle East and North Africa 8 9 7 
South Asia 9 8 26 
Sub-Saharan Africa 5 6 12 
The World Bank Health, Nutrition, and Population, 1994. Database 
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India's public healthcare funding 
The healthcare financing situation in India is dire at best. According to a 2001 report issued by 
the World Bank, public spending on health in India equates to less than 1 percent of India's 
GDP, poor in comparison to the average distribute of 2.8% in low- and middle-income 
countries[Ahuja:2004]. Public spending overall is inadequate to meet the needs of India's 
people and is even too deficient to provide the most basic of healthcare to the population. 
Furthermore, the government allocates the bulk of public spending to primary healthcare funds 
that are spread too thinly to provide effective care. [World Bank: 2001] 
While the government's inadequate health spending alone contributes significantly to the 
insufficient healthcare provided to its population, substandard distribution of these funds 
worsens India's health spending problems. Of the money allocated for public health spending 
by the government, a disproportionately large amount is spent on salaries, and staff logistics, 
while only a fraction of a percent is spent on actual user fees. Figure 2 illustrates the 
asymmetrical distribution of public health spending. 
In addition to the deficient allocation, limited public spending issued by the government is not, 
as one may assume, distributed solely among the underprivileged, but is also utilized by well-off 
sections of society. In fact, when dealing with curative public services, the wealthier section of 
Indian society receives almost three rupees of care for every one rupee of care provided to the 
poorest fifth of the population. Paralleled to the difference in monetary allocation of care, there 
are also large disparities in the distribution of types of services between classes of society. 
Health spending for the poorer sections of the population focuses greatly on primary healthcare 
services such as immunizations and other outpatient procedures, whereas inpatient care is less 
likely to reach poorer populations. [World Bank: 2001] 
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SHORTCOMINGS OF PUBLIC HEALTH DELIVERY IN INDIA 
It has been estimated that close to 87 percent of total health spending in India is private, and of 
that, 84.6 percent is out-of-pocket, point-of-service expenditure, lower only to Cambodia, the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, Georgia, Myanmar, and Sierra Leone. [Ahuja: 2004] Although 
state facilities exist, their lack of funding and blatant shortcomings forces India's population, 
even the rural poor, to rely on private providers for their healthcare needs. Because the poor 
generally have higher rates of morbidity and are more prone to disease, they are often required 
to pay more for their healthcare. Therefore, private expenditures leave vulnerable sections of 
society most affected by these forms of payment. [World Bank: 2005] 
The current rural health system is organized into three tiers: the first and most basic tier is the 
sub-center, which provides healthcare for five thousand people in general areas and for three 
thousand people in hilly, tribal, and backward areas. The second tier consists of primary health 
centers (PHCs), which cover care for 30 thousand people in general areas and 20 thousand 
people in hilly, tribal, and backward areas. (See Figure 3) PHCs are responsible for all 
ambulatory illness treatment services, routine preventive care practices, outpatient maternity 
care, as well as public health control measurements. Finally, community health centers (CHCs) 
make up the last of the three tiers covering care for 80 to 120 thousand people and providing 
specialized services in gynecology, pediatrics, surgery, and medicine. 
Figure 3: Rural health three-tier system 
Sub-centers: 3000 to 5000people covered 
Primary health centers (PHCs): 20,000 to 30,000people covered 
Community health centers (CHCs): 80,000 to 120,000people covered 
In spite of the structure of the rural health system, various problems exist. Firstly, the public 
health system is understaffed and overtaxed resulting in an acute shortage of healthcare workers, 
leaving posts unfilled and care undelivered. In comparison to staffing norms established for 
subcenters, PHCs, and CHCs, current numbers exhibit a shortfall of approximately 28,000 
auxiliary nurse midwives (ANMs), 65,000 male multipurpose workers, 21,000 nurse midwives, 
and 10,000 doctors. Additionally, money is misallocated for rural healthcare as it is primarily spent 
on salaries, with a minimum, percentage used for drugs, supplies, transport of patients, or 
maintenance. 
Studies show that people in rural areas are dissatisfied with the provided services. Reasons for this 
dissatisfaction are various: PHCs are generally far in distance, forcing people to walk or find some 
other mode of transportation in order to seek care. Even if people are able to reach the PHC, often 
the physician is either not present or unavailable to provide treatment. When people finally see a 
physician, prescriptions written often require people to travel another long distance to obtain 
medicines.  
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There is a significant shortage of medicine, as well as a lack of emergency equipment and life-saving 
drugs. Finally, long waiting hours and unsympathetic staff create additional reasons rural poor 
populations are dissatisfied with the public health system. Additionally, the rural public health sector 
lacks any structure for monitoring and quality assurance, resulting in the deliverance of the 
abovementioned inadequate care. [World Bank: 2001] 
This widespread dissatisfaction with the public rural system causes rural poor populations to seek 
private care or go to traditional healers for their health needs. In fact, a health study conducted in 
1997 at the Harvard School of Public Health showed that 82 percent of illness episodes in rural areas 
went to private practitioners for whom individuals were required to pay out-of-pocket, at the point of 
service.[Berman:1997] 
PRIVATE SPENDING PERPETUATES THE POVERTY CYCLE 
The trend of out-of-pocket health spending places the burden of health financing on the 
individual as opposed to the state, often causing poor families to fall below the poverty 
line. Although the rural poor are significantly less likely to be hospitalized for an ailment, 
the off occurrence of a hospitalization can imply catastrophic financial consequences for a 
poor family, especially without risk-pooling mechanisms to help families endure times of 
illness. [Garg: 1998].    Recent studies show that only 10 percent of India's population is 
covered under some form of risk-pooling. Hospitalized Indians who are predominantly the 
non-poor) spent more than 53 percent of their total annual expenditures on healthcare and 
close to 40 percent of those hospitalized borrowed money or sold assets to cover health 
costs.18 Families that are obliged to borrow money or sell assets to finance their care are 
frequently pushed under the poverty line as a result. Figure 4 demonstrates the percentage 
of hospitalized Indians who fall below the poverty line due to hospitalization costs. 
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NEED FOR HEALTH FINANCING IN INDIA 
As the figures demonstrate, for many people living in developing nations, illness represents 
a permanent threat to their income earning capacity and, therefore, their livelihood. Health 
insurance (i.e. the practice of risk-pooling) has been progressively more recognized as a 
tool to finance healthcare provision in the developing world. The high demand for good 
quality healthcare and the extreme underutilization of existing health services have given 
rise to the need for community health insurance—an arrangement that may both increase 
access to healthcare as well as theoretically improve its quality. While alternative forms of 
healthcare financing have been scrutinized, the option of insurance seems to be promising 
as it offers the opportunity to pool risk by converting unpredictable healthcare costs into 
fixed annual premiums. 
COMMUNITY-BASED HEALTH INSURANCE 
The typical dialogue surrounding health financing cites three main types of insurance as viable 
options to provide care. First is social health insurance, a practice initiated in several European 
countries where the working population of society provides health funds for the entire population, 
working and non-working. Social health insurance utilizes basic socialist principles to hold all 
sections of society accountable for the good of the community. The next type of insurance 
model is private health insurance, a structure that generally prevails in capitalist societies. 
Private insurance favors those who can afford to pay regular premiums, i.e. the middle class and 
the wealthy. Private insurance, therefore, inherently excludes the poor and only provides benefits 
to paying members. Finally, and most notable in discussing health for the rural poor, is 
community-based health insurance (CBHI).  
Studies conducted in various developing countries, including India, show that community-based 
health insurance (CBHI) schemes are highly effective in reaching poor populations. According to 
Friends of Women's World Banking, CBHI is defined as "any not-for-profit insurance scheme 
that is aimed primarily at the informal sector and formed on the basis of a collective pooling of 
health risks, and the members participate in its management." Such schemes frequently 
function in conjunction with healthcare providers or community organizations, such as local 
religious institutions, self-help groups (SHGs), or non-governmental organizations (NGOs). 
CBHI requires that people make a small contribution (i.e. pay a premium), which is then pooled 
to provide benefits, such as medical costs, to those within the pool who may need assistance. 
Unlike social or private health insurance schemes, CBHI is distinct in that it is generally 
initiated and managed by the community it benefits. This characteristic of CBHI is particularly 
important as it entails that the features of any specific CBHI scheme tailor to the local needs of the 
people. (See Figure 5) 
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—————————    Figure 5: CBHI schemes tailor to the community     ———————— 
Communal benefits of CBHI, in no specific order 
#1 Community-owned, therefore supported by a strong will to want it to succeed. 
#2 Design agrees with the needs of the community, therefore likely to be more effective in caring for 
beneficiaries. 
#3 Often managed or co-managed by the people, resulting in minimal overhead administrative costs 
if at all. 
#4 Effective in reducing informational asymmetries 
"Community Health Insurance in India." Friends of Women's World Banking, India. "April 
2005; Ahuja, R. "Health Insurance for the Poor in India." Indian Council for Research on 
International Economic Relations. March 2004. 
In fact, specifically in regards to low administrative costs, studies estimate that the average health 
insurance provider has to spend close to 20 percent of its premium amount on staff who are hired to 
popularize the idea of insurance, collect premiums, verify claims, and then ultimately reimburse 
them. In contrast, such costs can be minimized to a mere 5 to 6 percent of premium amounts for 
CBHI schemes, where the community manages or co-manages administrative tasks itself. Finally, 
CBHI have been known to make specific efforts to not only improve healthcare access to the rural 
poor, but to help fill gaps in levels of knowledge these target communities have regarding basic health 
information. Therefore, the health insurance schemes serve to improve access to healthcare systems 
while also improving healthcare education for these marginalized populations. 
CBHI schemes take on various shapes 
To date, there are approximately 30 CBHI schemes across India conservatively covering 3.5 million 
Indians.[World Bank:2005].  Each of these implemented schemes present unique characteristics as an 
inherent feature of their tailoring to the communities they serve. As a result, CBHI schemes have 
been established using multiple techniques of administration and efficiency practices. 
CBHI schemes generally assume one of three main models: the provider model, the insurer model, 
and the linked model. In the provider model, the NGO acts as both the provider of healthcare as well 
as the agent collecting premiums and needed funds. Taking a slightly more distant approach, in the 
insurer model the NGO, in conjunction with other community-based organizations (CBOs), acts 
solely as the insurance agency, requiring them to either purchase healthcare services from a 
network of providers or reimburse CBHI members after having received and paid for care. 
Lastly, in the linked model, NGOs and CBOs act as intermediaries between the insurance 
agency, the providers, and the insured members. In this last model, the NGO and CBO act 
mainly in managing the scheme. Figure 6 depicts the variety of roles NGOs can assume. 
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Each of these three models carry with them specific idiosyncrasies that are often examined 
through the evaluation of the following meters: freedom to suit the local needs, premiums, benefit 
packages, financial risks, quality of care, and community involvement. For instance, the provider 
model allows for maximum flexibility in suiting local needs as the NGO sees fit, while the linked 
model scheme must function depending on the parameters of the insurance company employed. 
Similarly for premiums, the provider and insured models usually base their premiums on 
affordability and are set by NGOs and CBOs, whereas insurance companies dictate premiums set 
through the linked model. Benefit packages for linked CBHI schemes are restricted to the 
insurance provider and almost always have policy limitations and exclusions, while provider and 
insured schemes are open to including benefits relevant to the people. When it comes to 
financial risk, the provider and insurer models carry the most risk, while the linked model places 
a predominance of the financial burden on the insurance company itself. As for the quality of 
care, theoretically it should improve with the provider and insular models because they cater 
directly to the community, however with financial constraints, in application, the linked model 
may actually provide the highest quality of care. Community involvement is almost entirely 
dependent on each individual scheme and the parameters set by the insurance companies, the 
healthcare providers, and the NGOs and CBOs. 
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CBHI SCHEMES STILL FALL SHORT ON SEVERAL FRONTS 
While CBHI models appear to be ideal solutions to the healthcare issues of the rural poor, like all 
developmental schemes they also have shortcomings that remain to affect their success. For one, 
the unique traits of each scheme make it nearly impossible to establish a pan-India CBHI 
scheme, which creates severe barriers to replicating the plans for future application. Furthermore, 
CBHI schemes are not financially padded and therefore highly vulnerable to bankruptcy in the 
event of a catastrophe. Finally, as a result of their organic nature, such insurance plans tend to 
lack in technical expertise, which may lead to significant impediments in effectiveness and 
efficiency.  
Perhaps the most alarming drawback, however, even despite their focus on affordability and the 
community, is that CBHI schemes are not able to protect the poorest segments of the community. 
While this is a failing of almost all types of insurance, it appears most offensive for CBHI 
schemes that came about as a means to help the ultra-poor population. It is said that this 
unfortunately large segment of the Indian population are so poor that even the reduced premium 
amounts are too costly and not urgent enough for them to invest. Simultaneously, recent studies 
have noted that increasingly even the poorest of families can afford small intermittent 
contributions, which over a period of time can add up to a significant amount. 29 While the latter 
may be telltale of emerging trends, the former is a more accurate account of predominant issues 
facing healthcare financing in India today. 
Recognizing this as a major glitch in CBHI schemes, current plans in India have invented their 
own ad hoc solutions to include the poorest sectors of the populations. For instance, the staff 
members of Medical Insurance Scheme (MIS)—RAHA, pay the premiums for the poorest 
communities in their field area out of their own pockets. Similarly, ACCORD-AMS-ASHWINI 
Health Insurance asks for greater premium contributions from those who can afford them to help 
subsidize the premium costs for those who cannot.  Finally, in some states and through sparse 
policies, the government also provides certain subsidies to this section of society. All of these 
arrangements, however, are improvised, as mentioned, with no formal or sustainable structure in 
place. 
Advancing the Public-Private Partnership 
The term public-private partnership (PPP) carries with it a variety of connotations, many of 
which remain confusing and at times even conflict. Due to the diverse nature of development 
schemes in general, PPP programs have taken on multiple forms and focuses, often redefining 
its most current explanation. In a general sense, PPP, as it pertains to development, has been 
defined as "institutional relationships between the state and the private for-profit and/or the 
private not for-profit sector, where the different public and private actors jointly participate in 
defining the objectives, the methods, and the implementation of an agreement of 
cooperation.[Jutting:2000]. 
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However, for the purposes of this study, the not for-profit sector can be re-characterized as a 
public actor seeing as it assumes greater responsibilities in implementing and enforcing social 
developmental schemes otherwise overseen by the government. Therefore, PPPs can also be 
defined as institutional relationships between the for-profit private sector and various actors in 
both the not for-profit sector and the state—parties that directly work on issues of public 
concern. It is the latter of these definitions that will be most applicable to the following 
discussion. 
Since the notion of a partnership implies that the parties involved contribute mutually to some 
ongoing set of interactions aimed to meet a purpose, these same parties must agree to the roles 
they play within this union. The actors of a PPP can take on one of three common functions: pro 
visionary, financial, and regulatory & monitory. Those in the provisionary role literally provide a 
service to the target community, such as healthcare or education. On the other hand, actors 
assuming the financial role simply help to monetarily support the implementation of the set 
goal. Finally, PPP players who acquire the regulatory and monitory role take responsibility for 
many administrative tasks required to ensure sustainability and efficiency of the 
objective.Jutting:2000] 
Leveraging the public-private partnership for healthcare financing 
Although the discussion regarding PPP in the health sector typically addresses the private and 
public health delivery mechanisms and ways in which the two can cooperatively provide care, 
the value of a PPP arrangement can also be utilized to make healthcare financing viable for the 
rural poor. As the previous section enumerates, while CBHI schemes have been the most 
successful programs in extending the reach of healthcare financing to the poor of India, such 
plans are still unproductive in insuring the extreme poor populations of the nation. With limited 
ability to pay for their daily means, individuals and families that fall into this poorest section of 
society are both unwilling and unable to fund monthly or annual CBHI premiums integral to the 
mechanism of risk pooling. This inherent malfunction in CBHI schemes can be amended 
through the utilization of PPPs. 
Riding the momentum of the increasing trend toward corporate-social responsibility, 
corporations all over India have begun to include issues of social concern on their agendas. 
More and more companies have initiated projects in which administrators allocate resources, 
both manual and financial, to help advance a social need, such as contributing to funds created 
for education or health. In some cases, corporations have even established full committees 
dedicated to seeking out opportunities for the company to remain actively and continually 
involved with certain development schemes. EATON Corporation, in Pune has established 
multi member committees of employee who survey assess and initiate participation in various 
developmental projects with NGOs in the area. .  The same behavior can be leveraged to provide 
healthcare financing for the rural poor. 
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Because affordability is a salient issue preventing the rural poor from obtaining CBHI, receiving 
monetary support from the proximal corporate sector offers an efficient and effective solution. 
As well, for corporations looking to satisfy their corporate-social responsibility commitment, 
providing financial support for a project serves as a useful and straightforward mechanism to aid 
the community. Specifically dealing with healthcare financing, corporations could finance the 
insurance premiums for severely poor families in need of greater access to the health system. 
IMPLEMENTATION: THE ROLE OF THE NGO AS AN INTERMEDIARY 
While the abovementioned PPP appears sound in theory, there are many logistical complications 
that could make this type of corporate sponsorship program ineffective. NGOs must be appointed 
as central actors in such a sponsorship program as they are integral to the program's 
implementation. While the financial means falls within the hands of the corporations, 
accessibility to the community is a privilege almost exclusively held by the NGO. NGOs are 
closely linked to rural village communities within which they work. Generally speaking, 
members of an NGO have worked with the same community for multiple years and have built a 
rapport and trust that a newcomer would not experience. It is through this fundamental 
relationship that NGOs are able to help put into practice developmental schemes that rural poor 
communities would otherwise live without. Combining the strengths of these two major 
components, the for-profit private sector can come together with the not for-profit sector through 
a PPP that can help bring healthcare to the villages. 
Working off of the various CBHI models, the corporate sponsorship program can take on one of 
two implementation models: one where the NGO acts as the intermediary between the insurance 
provider, the sponsoring corporation, and the community, and the other where the NGO actually 
acts as the insurance provider, and assumes the role as an intermediary between the corporations 
and the community. (See Figure 7). 
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Literally occupying the central role, NGOs are charged with the position of connecting for-profit 
funding to the community's health needs, while, in the case of model two, cooperating with an 
outside insurance agency. NGOs also may carry administrative burdens such as the collection of 
corporate contributions and the gathering of member information from the rural poor population. 
The case study on the following page outlines the basic features of one such PPP currently being 
piloted in the Indian state of Maharashtra. 
CASE STUDY: CHAITANYA AND HDFC-CHUBB GENERAL 
INSURANCE 
As an example of the above-examined PPP, Chaitanya and HDFC-Chubb General 
Insurance,located in the Pune district of Maharashtra, have recently joined in an endeavor 
attempting to provide CBHI coverage to SHG -women and their families in the Chaitanya 
field area..Founded in 1993, Chaitanya focuses on the establishment and strengthening of 
SHGs and development through micro-finance programs. Chaitanya's work has motivated 
the formation of the Grameen Mahila Swayamsiddha Sangha, the first independent federation 
of SHGs in Maharashtra. Currently, Chaitanya also carries out developmental activities 
including water & sanitation, agriculture, livelihood, and health. 
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HDFC-Chubb General Insurance (GIC) 
HDFC Bank and Chubb Corporation, USA entered a venture together in 2002 to jointly offer 
general insurance services. Specifically, HDFC-Chubb GIC offers a rural initiatives program 
tailored to meet the needs of the rural poor and offer insurance services at reduced costs. 
Rural initiatives group health insurance package 
Covers both personal accident and hospitalization expenses 
Special care and emphasis for women in both personal accident and hospitalization 
expenses 
 
Coverage of husband's accidental death 
Permanent disability for the woman member 
"Maternity benefit hospitalization coverage for both normal and cesarean births 
Compensation of lost wages due to hospitalization 
Members insured                                                                    Premium  
                                                                                                       [Per family] 
Insured member and spouse only 165 275 385 500 
Insured member, spouse, and up to a 
maximum of two dependent children 
220 330 440 600 
Insured member, spouse, up to a maximum 
of two dependent children, and dependent 
parents 
330 495 630 825 
Coverage received 7000 14000 21000 28000 
Corporate sponsorship program 
As a means to help villagers help finance premium costs, Chaitanya and HDFC-Chubb GIC have 
petitioned corporations in the Pune area to become a third link to this PPP, filling a financial role 
in the partnership. Specifically, representatives have made presentations to corporations to 
encourage corporate employees to participate in a one-to-one sponsorship program where one 
corporate employee would sponsor the health insurance premium for one specific family in the 
villages Chaitanya oversees.   Money contributed to the scheme first goes to Chaitanya who then 
deposits a lump sum into the HDFC-Chubb system. Chaitanya provides the link between 
HDFC-Chubb, contributing corporations, and the rural villages. 
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Corporations and NGOs assess degree of involvement 
Just as the NGO may play various roles, the corporations involved in this scheme can also 
participate in more than one manner. For instance, if a corporation believes that this particular 
funding scheme is one through which it would like to make a long-term commitment, then 
NGOs can focus on linking up with a few select corporations who plan to maintain a multiple 
year partnership with the NGO and its relevant villages. The concern that lies with this plan, 
however, is that if these few committed corporations fold at some point or back out of the made 
agreement, the NGO, and the community, would lose a large portion of the premium money, 
leaving the scheme financially vulnerable. On the other hand, if corporations are not attracted to 
making long-term funding commitments, NGOs can focus on obtaining a broad base of 
corporations that regularly contribute, while the NGO simultaneously and constantly recruits 
more. This latter model allows for a continual flow of premium money without incurring 
significant set backs if a corporation were to change its plans, however, lacks a type of 
investment in its community that the former model would encourage. Furthermore, following 
the diversification option would require the NGO to consistently and actively create new 
partnerships while attempting to manage those already existing. Figure 8 outlines advantages 
and disadvantages to the type of involvement corporations can make. 
Figure 8 
Nature of 
investment  
Duration of 
financial 
commitment 
Consistent 
money flow 
Financial risk Relationship 
maintenance 
on part of 
NGO 
Community 
investment by 
contributor 
Few select 
corporations 
invest 
Long-term Yes High High High 
Many various 
companies 
invest 
Highly 
variable 
No Low Low Low 
 14
PPP must include features to help change mindsets, not merely behavior 
While the funding of such a scheme is an effective means to initiate CBHI schemes, it is 
imperative that certain measurements are put in place to ensure that villagers' mindsets expand 
in regards to their understanding and knowledge of healthcare practices. The facilitating of 
healthcare financing for rural poor should help improve access to the healthcare system, but not 
without some investment on the part of those receiving its benefit. For this reason, any offering 
made from the corporate end of the PPP should be partial in its contribution, and with time, 
taper (See Figure 9). For instance, the first few years that such a PPP manages to successfully 
enroll and maintain a rural villager membership, the corporate contribution should equal 95 
percent of the premium cost, leaving the remaining 5 percent onus on the villagers themselves. 
After the first few years, the corporate contribution should lessen, going from 95 percent, to 80 
percent, then eventually to 50 percent, and so on incrementally until corporations are providing 
minimal to no funding for these premiums. Ideally speaking, after five to 10 years of utilizing a 
type of healthcare financing scheme, the villagers themselves will find value in the insurance 
and be willing to finance their own premiums.   Of course, certain provisions must be made for 
those families unable to pay for their own premiums regardless of their understanding the value 
of investing in one's health. 
In addition to ensuring that villagers provide some monetary investment in their health, 
rural poor populations enrolled in the corporate sponsorship PPP must receive regular information 
regarding the scheme, its purpose, and the importance of sound health habits overall—a task most 
likely to be delegated to the intermediate NGO. Healthcare financing must serve not only as a 
means for the poor to gain access to the health system, but also as a tool through which rural 
populations gain a greater understanding about preventative health practices and why habitual 
investments in one's health today will save more money in the future. Corporate financing of this 
scheme is a means through which healthcare financing can be made possible for the poor, but it 
should not be a permanent fixture in their lives. 
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Conclusion 
Developmental schemes to curb the poverty cycle are numerous and each distinct in their approaches 
to mobilizing unprivileged communities. Development in the health sector is one of the most basic 
areas through which rural poor populations of developing nations, such as India, can gain ground in 
advancing their community. The lack of adequate healthcare for these groups originates from their 
lack of education as well as from poor healthcare infrastructure in the nation. The disproportionate 
amount of private health spending to that of public spending in India places the burden of healthcare 
in the hands of the everyday individual, expenditures that are often too expensive for average 
households to shoulder, let alone the poorer segments of society. As this report details, the most 
viable and present solution to improve people's healthcare access in India, while making financing 
affordable, is to invest in CBHI schemes tailored to provide basic healthcare to those without. As a 
means to ensure effective and efficient implementation of CBHI schemes, the private and public 
sectors should come together in a joint project through which the rural poor can receive health 
coverage through the reallocation of capital. 
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